Serious German and French strategists read the treaty in this way and argued that in 1919 it had left France in a weaker position than in 1914. In particular, France no longer had an alliance with Russia to balance Germany, and France`s intensive efforts to make Poland a reliable Eastern ally proved difficult to maintain. The allied politicians had also not responded to Foch`s council to separate the German states west of the Rhine and to create, through a reciprocal security pact, a separate Rhine state, linked to France. Instead, the treaty was compromised by the demilitarization of the Rhineland and by the limitation of the size of the German army and the weapons that the Germans could possess. However, as Foch predicted, these limits proved almost impossible to monitor and the Germans found ways to circumvent them, such as the Rapallo agreements for the training of soldiers and test equipment in Russia. Max Hantke and Mark Spoerer wrote.“ Historians of the army and the economy found, before 1933, that the German army had only marginally exceeded the boundaries of the treaty.  Adam Tooze agreed and wrote: „To put this into perspective, the annual military expenditure of the Weimar Republic was not counted in billions, but in the hundreds of millions of German marks“; For example, the Weimar Republic`s 1931 programme, with 480 million German marks over five years compared to the Nazi government`s 1933 plan, to spend 4.4 billion German Marks per year.  P.M. H. Bell argued that the British government was aware of Weimar`s subsequent rearmament and gave serious publicity to German efforts by not opposing them, a view shared by Churchill.   [short incomplete quotation] Norman Davies wrote that a „strange mistake“ of military restrictions was that they had „not included missiles in their list of prohibited weapons“, which led Wernher von Braun to an exploration zone that eventually led to „his break in 1943“ that led to the development of the V-2 rocket.
 The Allies, desperate to reduce defence spending and the risk of further bloodshed, were also unwilling to commit to occupying or monitoring Germany in the long term to impose the conditions that the Germans could accept. Indeed, many allied politicians, particularly in Britain, wanted Germany to recover quickly, both to restore the balance of power on the continent and for German consumers, to be able to buy British products again. Britain needed a treaty that kept Germany strong enough to serve as the engine of a post-war European economic recovery, but not strong enough to pose a threat to the European political system. It is very unlikely that any contract negotiated Scylla and Charybde in the post-war years. The treaty itself was based on Germany`s guilt in the war. The document deprived Germany of 13 per cent of its territory and one tenth of its population. The Rhineland was occupied and demilitarized and the German colonies were taken over by the new League of Nations.